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Abstract 
Medical simulation has historically been studied in terms of the delivery of learning outcomes, or 
the social construction of knowledge. Consequently, simulation-based medical education has 
been researched primarily in terms of the transfer of skills, or the reproduction of professional 
communities of practice. We make a case for studying simulation-based medical education as a 
cultural practice, situating it within a history of gaming and simulation, and which, by virtue of 
distinctive aesthetics, does not simply teach skills or reproduce professional practices but rather 
transforms how medicine can be made sense of. Three concepts from the field of game studies – 
play, narrative and simulation – are deployed to interpret an ethnographic study of hospital-based 
simulation centres and describe under-reported phenomena, including the cooperative work 
involved in maintaining a fictional world, the narrative conventions by which medical 
intervention are portrayed, and the political consequences of simulating the division of labour. 
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Games and simulations are widely used in healthcare education. In teaching hospitals, trainees 
are commonly involved in role-play to rehearse conversations with patients and colleagues, and 
in simulations to practise clinical skills, such as laparoscopy (Bradley, 2006). In healthcare 
provision, patients are provided with ‘games for health’, ‘exergames’ and instances of 
‘gamification’ to manage medical conditions, from obesity to diabetes. The study of these 
practices has treated games and simulations instrumentally, as means to ends – as in the phrase 
‘games for health’ (Ferrara, 2013; Bogost, 2007). This has led to a methodological concern with 
measuring outcomes, such as changes in skill levels or attitudes (Dieckmann et al, 2009). It has 
also lead to treating games and simulations as transparent interfaces what provide access to 
content and cognition (Pelletier, 2006). This methodological stance neglects the significance of 
games and simulations as forms of expression that shape what is learned by virtue of how it is 
learned (Bligh & Bleakley, 2006). For example, measuring changes in performance before and 
after usage of a laparoscopic simulator reveals something about how the simulator could be used 
to develop surgical skills (Larsen et al, 2009), but it doesn’t identify the conditions under which 
the body is perceptible as ‘simulatable’, how representational conventions and programming 
capacity in 3D animation determine what surgery is shown to consist of, or whose version of 
reality is invoked (and whose is marginalised) when the simulator is called ‘high-fidelity’ 
(Johnson, 2008; Prentice, 2005; Waldby, 1997). 
 
These aesthetic and ethical considerations characterise the study of games and simulations as 
cultural practices. Broadly speaking, one might identify research that examines games and 
simulations as cultural practices in terms of its concern with representational conventions and 
semiotic operations, game players/users’ actions and interactions, and design/production as 
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socio-economic activities (we draw here on the distinction, in media studies, between the study 
of texts, audiences or institutions – Tudor, 1999). This varied body of research, which focuses on 
the significance of games and simulations as expressive forms, has had relatively little impact in 
healthcare, as demonstrated by journals such as Simulation in Healthcare, Games for Health 
Journal, and Simulation and Gaming, in which articles reference publications primarily in the 
related professional domain rather than in that of game, play or cultural studies. Our aim in this 
article is to demonstrate the benefit for the study and practice of medical simulation of paying 
greater attention to the medium, and not only the message: in other words, we aim to show what 
can be seen and done with medical simulation when it is treated as a cultural practice, and not 
simply a means of content or skill delivery.  
 
This work treads close to an area of work referred to as ‘serious games’. As Charsky (2010) and 
Ferrara (2013) define them in this journal, ‘serious games’ solve the pedagogic problems caused 
by simply disguising unappetising educational content in the sweet wrapping of simulation 
technologies by focusing on the experience of the player/user and the quality of the design; an 
approach which builds on, rather than neglects, an analysis of games and simulations as aesthetic 
experiences. Whilst highlighting the significance of the medium, ‘serious games’ research has 
concerned itself primarily with identifying good design principles, notably by developing and 
testing prototypes. One implication is that a ‘serious game’ is identified in terms of its intended 
outcomes, with seriousness then referring to what designers want to achieve. Medical simulation 
can, in this light, be categorized as a serious game: its intention is to train, according to a 
pedagogic model imported from aviation (CMO, 2008; Gaba, 2004). Issenberg et al (2005, p.23), 
for example, conclude their systematic review of medical simulation by defining it as an 
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“opportunity for learners to engage in focused, repetitive practice where the intent is skill 
improvement, not idle play” [our italics].  
A problem with focusing on intents and their realization is that the unintended is overlooked as 
insignificant. So, although the serious games movement pays attention to the medium, it 
identifies this in terms of the manifestation of intentions, a move that neglects examining how a 
game is signified in context, in relation to the activities and practices of which it is a part. The 
methodological point here is that a concern with intentions and their measurement obscures 
perception of the ways in which a simulation assumes its form within an ‘assemblage’ of 
historical and cultural practices constitutive of the setting in which it is played or used, and 
within which it assumes meaning, ‘serious’ or not (Taylor, 2009). This is one way of 
understanding why the serious games literature has focused so much on outcomes measures, and 
so little on textual analysis, ethnographies, or non-controlled/experimental settings, which might 
undo the specificity of its object of study. The related pedagogical point is that the identifier 
‘serious’, and the distinction between it and other forms of gaming/simulation, hides how a 
simulation is played, idly or not: for example, the way simulation-based education requires the 
participative establishment of a fictional reality. Acknowledging this, rather than rendering it 
invisible, opens up scope to explore how fictionalization and other play-related activities make 
educational practices possible, and, significantly, how they determine what is learned.  
 
For example, in the cultural study of medicine and medical technology, a body of literature has 
examined ‘serious games’ and simulations as reifications of practices for acting on the body (e.g. 
McNaughton, 2012; Taylor, 2011; Lizama, 2009; Johnson 2008; Prentice, 2005; Thacker, 2001; 
Hayles, 1999; Waldby 1997). These studies identify the conventions according to which ‘the 
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body’ or ‘the patient’ is established, maintained and de-stabilised as a realistic entity, in software 
or in face-to-face role play. Teaching and learning with simulations appear, in this literature, to 
involve more than the realization of intended learning outcomes. McNaughton (2012, p246) 
highlights the loss of control over the delivery of formalized professional competences in 
medical simulation, with the simulation of patients suffering from mental disorders leading to 
what she describes as “learning envisioned as a process of becoming […], a liminal experience 
that involves mourning the loss of certainty and […] an affective and emotional undertaking”. 
Lizama (2009, p134-135) also notes the tropes of horror and nostalgia that haunt anatomical 
simulations, including “the affect elicited by the complete decimation of the body’s organic form 
and the re-ordering of its physicality in terms of geometric rather than organic principles”, a form 
of visualization which removes the body’s excessive, visceral fluidity. Lizama suggests that such 
simulations make the body knowable as information, rather than substance, a move which 
reiterates the desire to control bodily aberrance and disintegration.  
 
Although cultural studies of medical technologies analyse simulations in terms of textual 
practices, approaches that escape attribution to any author’s intentions, such research pays 
limited attention to gaming and simulation per se, as genres of activity. The relevant field within 
which simulation is seen to emerge is identified in terms of medical technologies and medical 
knowledge; limited attempt is made to contextualise medical simulation within a history of 
gaming and simulation, for example, by discussing it in terms of an aesthetics of simulation, 
histories of play-acting, fictional forms, or participative dramatisation, or indeed debates about 
serious games. This has several implications. Treating simulation-based medical education as a 
cultural practice within medicine, rather than within gaming and simulation, leads 
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methodologically to a concern with the social construction of reality, at the expense of seeing it 
as a practice of play-acting, pretending, and story-telling. It leads also to an interest in how 
novices participate in communities of experts, rather than in communities of players, modellers, 
and actors. Such perspectives determine how medical simulation is judged. For instance, in some 
of the studies cited above (e.g. Waldby, 1997; Thacker, 2001; Hayles, 1999), there is a tendency 
to treat medical simulation as an inherently impoverished version of authentic practice (Grace, 
2003).  
 
Maintaining a dichotomy between the real/the embodied and the virtual/the disembodied, 
overlooks simulation’s productivity: the way in which it brings new realities into being. This is a 
primary concern, we would argue, in cultural studies of games and play, which focus on them as 
genres in their own right, rather than in relation to a presumed authenticity (Dormans, 2008; 
Bogost 2007). For this reason, games and play studies can make a valuable contribution to 
simulation-based medical education. 
 
We endeavor to demonstrate this in two ways. First, by presenting an account of simulation-
based medical education organized around concepts developed in relation to games as cultural 
practices. And second, by highlighting the sensibilities made possible by such concepts in 
contrast to methodological perspectives tracing intentions and their realizations. In other words, 
we illustrate what can be seen about medical simulation when it is treated as a representational 
and dramatic practice, and how this differs from how simulation is normally perceived in the 
clinical and ‘serious games’ literature. In identifying the expressive possibilities of simulation, 
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we also show how it is implicated in making medicine meaningful, rather than leading inevitably 
to its impoverishment in relation to an authentic form.  
 
The concepts have been chosen for their scope in describing simulation as a genre rather than a 
technology. They are: play, narrative, and simulation, as defined by Brian Sutton-Smith, Janet 
Murray and Gonzalo Frasca respectively, whose work is central to video game studies but whose 
analyses extend to other media; this is important for us, since the kind of simulation-based 
medical education we have researched is not primarily software-based.  Before we move on to 
the analysis, we will briefly describe our study, including what we mean by ‘high-fidelity’ and 
‘immersive’ simulation.  
 
High-fidelity, immersive medical simulation 
 
Although simulation has always featured in medical education to teach specific tasks – for 
example, chicken meat has long been used to simulate human flesh in teaching suturing – it has 
more recently been conceived as a way of addressing the limitations of work-based learning, 
including reduced working hours, shorter in-patient stays in hospitals, and increased fears about 
patient safety (DoH, 2010; Ziv et al, 2003). This concern has prompted efforts to simulate the 
complexity of the clinical setting, including its social and emotional dimensions, rather than 
isolated tasks or body parts (Curran, 2010; Kneebone, 2005). Simulation that renders the setting, 
rather than the task, is often referred to as ‘high-fidelity’ or ‘immersive’ (CMO, 2008; Issenberg 
et al, 2005). It is most commonly practised in dedicated simulation centres within hospitals, 
which are constituted by simulated wards and operating theatres, and manikins (see image 1).  
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[insert image 1: a simulated ward, with a one way mirror, behind which educators observe 
trainees and control the manikin’s physiological outputs] 
 
One of the authors of this paper, Roger Kneebone (2010), has challenged many assumptions 
underpinning immersive simulation, for instance by showing that realism is a function of a 
practitioner’s concern, rather than the detailed reproduction of a setting. In 2012, he dedicated 
part of a research programme funded by the London Deanery
i
 to exploring how immersive 
simulation is practised routinely, in London’s teaching hospitals, including how realism is 
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achieved in everyday teaching practice. This is the work that Caroline Pelletier – the other author 
of this paper - undertook, by means of an observational study of four simulation centres in 
London (UK).  
 
Over a 10-month period (Jan-Oct 2012), Caroline sat in on 30 half or whole day high-fidelity, 
immersive simulation courses. The clinicians doing such courses were trainee doctors (from 
Foundation to Registrar level
ii
), sometimes also with nurses and other health professionals. The 
courses were usually attended by 6-12 trainees, and taught by 4-6 educators, consisting of senior 
nurses and doctors. Observations focused on courses about human factors, since this is how the 
contribution of high-fidelity simulation was described by educators; it was also the topic of most 
courses taught in the centres. Ethical approval was provided by Imperial College, London.  
 
Courses had three parts. First, lectures about a course’s purpose. Second, a sequence of scenarios 
(between 2 and 6), lasting approximately 15 minutes, and in which 1-2 trainees acted out a 
situation. For example, a trainee might be told ‘Mrs Smith has been brought into A&E by her 
sister. She is complaining of stomach pain, and you are the first doctor to examine her’, and then 
sent into the simulation room to respond to the various prompts given by educators from the 
control room and by ‘plants’ playing the role of nurse, consultant or relative. Third, and 
following each scenario, a ‘de-briefing’, lasting between 20 and 45 minutes, and in which 
educators and all the trainees discussed the scenario. Scenarios were observed by trainees in the 
de-briefing room via an audio-visual feed consisting of multiple camera angles. Caroline was 
often given this feed and the analysis below is based on this, as well as field notes.  
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It was during field note coding that we considered the analytic benefits of organising a write-up 
of this study using concepts associated with the field of game studies, since they allowed us to 
account for under-reported phenomena in the clinical and sociological literature. These included 
the narrative conventions by which scenarios unfold, the emotions consequent upon dramatising 
clinical practice, and the cooperative work involved in maintaining a pretense - active and 
ideological work which goes far beyond the passive ‘suspension of disbelief’ called for in 
accounts of simulation-based teaching (e.g. Gaba et al, 2001). The game studies literature offers 
resources for studying these aspects. In this respect, treating medical simulation as a game does 
not mean equating it with mere idleness, but rather allows it to be framed as an activity 
implicated in symbolising the world and, consequently, in experimenting with how it can be 
made sense of. 
 
Play – or the phantasmagoria of medical simulation 
 
Sutton-Smith’s (1997) review of the play literature starts from the argument that the word is used 
to describe a vast range of phenomena. He imposes order by describing seven rhetorics that 
sustain the identification of play. These rhetorics are “cultural ‘ways of thought’” (p8), drawn 
upon by researchers “to persuade us in innumerable ways that their choice and their direction of 
research or study is sound”
iii
 (p.8); they function therefore as “ideological values” (p.8), which 
sustain the claim to knowing the difference between play and its other. In education, the most 
prominent rhetoric, according to Sutton-Smith, is that of ‘play as progress’, in which play is 
understood in terms of moral, social and cognitive growth. Play is valued and studied to the 
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extent that it will eventually be not-play (Mandiberg, 2011): dolls become babies, practice 
fighting becomes real fighting, playmates become co-workers.  
 
This rhetoric is recognizable in claims about the educational benefits of simulation (Pelletier, 
2009), including medical simulation. For example, Alinier (2010, 2008) refers to the props 
(glasses, hearing aids, etc.) and costumes (torn trousers, patient gowns, etc.) involved in 
simulation-based medical education, accounting for these in terms of the realization of learning 
outcomes. Since these outcomes pertain to skills relevant to the workplace, such props are treated 
as resources for the establishment of realism.  
 
The significance of this point, and the rhetoric within which it is embedded, emerges by 
contrasting it with other rhetorical alternatives described by Sutton-Smith, and which do not 
align easily with a narrative about skill development. We will focus here on Sutton-Smith’s 
characterization of the rhetoric of the imaginary, drawn on to describe a range of practices 
relating to mythology, deconstruction, pretense and enjoyment. Sutton-Smith describes the main 
claim of this rhetoric as follows:  
 
We are eternally making over the world in our minds, and much of it is fantasy. 
The difference is that while children have toys, adults usually have images, 
words, music and daydreams, which perform the same function as toys. Our 
fantasies are the microworlds of inner life that all of us manipulate in our own 
way to come to terms with feelings, conflicts, realities, and aspirations as they 
enter into our lives. Children and adults may not really be so different in their 
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use of fantasy play...Play is not based primarily on a representation of everyday 
real events - as many prior investigators have supposed - so much as it is based 
on a fantasy of emotional events. (p. 156 – our italics) 
 
Within this rhetoric, play is understood to be motivated by feelings rather than images of reality. 
It appears as an emotionally vivid experience, which allows the limits imposed by normal or 
non-play reality to be transcended; mocked as much as mimicked. Rather than representing the 
world, play deconstructs it, taking it apart in order to suit players’ emotional responses to events.  
 
If we draw on this rhetoric to examine our field data, we see phenomena that are rarely 
commented upon in the literature on medical simulation. As Alinier notes, for instance, the 
representation of medical practice calls on educators to deploy wigs, make-up and costumes (see 
images 2, 3 and 4); but focusing on how this teaches skills by ‘representing everyday real events’ 
overlooks the function of this theatrical apparel in sustaining emotionally dramatic scenes. 
Educators did not simply ‘represent’ reality: they taught by pretending to be violent drunk 
patients, anxious and unreasoning relatives, and confused, demented old ladies. These parts were 
often played with relish: great pleasure appeared to be taken in acting outrageously at work, for 
instance, in a nurse’s pretense of a drunk patient shouting expletives or a doctor’s enactment of 
an irresponsibly dismissive attitude. Such enjoyment – absent from functional accounts of 
simulation-based medical education - might be understood as an instance of the carnivalesque 
(Bakhtin, 1984), in which the sobriety of normal life is overturned and social functions 
temporarily exchanged. 
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Acting was not restricted to simulating patients but also professions and grades, whose 
characteristic traits were exaggerated to signify the role symbolised: thus, consultants were 
played invariably as decisive and concise, and nurses, by contrast, as either friendly and 
approachable or stubbornly bureaucratic, attributes which arguably reflect feelings towards those 
professions rather than data on their ‘real’ behaviour. 
 
 
[Insert image 2: wigs for use on the manikin 
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[Insert image 3: boxes of props and costumes] 
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[Insert image 4: manikin dressed up to be a woman. Bras and padding added to a manikin were, 
in all observed instances, large and plentiful, denoting the female form in a recognizably 
theatrical way] 
 
This ‘emotionally vivid’ role playing – to use Sutton-Smith’s phrase - often provoked laughter in 
control rooms: 
 
In the control room, John answers the phone, playing the role of a consultant. In 
a strong Scottish accent he says: ‘Hamish McTaggart by name...’ The other 
educators in the control room laugh loudly. John then enters the simulation suite. 
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Lindsey, the trainee, says to him ‘Hi John’. He responds in a heavy Australian 
accent: ‘I’m Shane’. 
[Field notes] 
 
The parody of accents and professional traits was mirrored in the exaggeration of symptoms. 
Educators explained this in terms of the importance of teaching trainees how to manage clinical 
situations: it was imperative, then, that trainees recognize a situation as pertinent to clinical 
knowledge. A scenario was deemed a failure if a trainee did not identify the clinical condition, or 
if the scenario did not make it sufficiently visible. For example, the following field note was 
made during one scenario in which a trainee had failed to identify symptoms manifested by the 
manikin: 
 
John asks the technician to increase the settings on the manikin, so that the heart 
rate falls even more quickly. He then turns to me and says: “well, you have got 
to make it obvious what is going on, otherwise they just don't know”. 
[Field notes] 
 
Symptoms and conditions therefore appeared heightened and exaggerated. This same 
phenomenon was evoked by trainees in terms of the speed with which time passed during a 
scenario, with patients apparently deteriorating much more quickly than in ‘real life’, making 
simulated clinical emergencies temporally, and also emotionally, highly urgent and dramatic.  
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This urgency, and the excitement and anxiety it generated, contrasts with how trainees 
represented their everyday work in discussions:   
 
During the coffee break, Susan, a trainee, says to another trainee standing next 
to her: ‘In my hospital, there isn’t a cannula on the whole ward. None of the 
equipment works. The seniors aren’t at all interested in your situation. But I 
guess there would be no point in simulating this, as what we want to learn is the 
clinical stuff. 
[Field notes] 
 
The italics here highlight the expression of desire - “what we want to learn is the clinical stuff” – 
which illustrates Sutton-Smith’s point that play is performed “to come to terms with feelings, 
conflicts, realities, and aspirations as they enter into our lives”. The purpose of a course, and the 
principle according to which aspects of reality were treated as ‘simulatable’, was – in Susan’s 
words here – the expression of a wish: of learning ‘clinical stuff’; of doing meaningful, satisfying, 
effective work. It follows that what was not simulated, or selected as significant for 
representation, were the dissatisfying, intractable, limiting aspects of life in hospital.  
 
To give a final illustration of the way simulation can be seen to be “about [players’] feelings 
about reality and not about the direct representation of reality as such” (Sutton-Smith, 1997, 
p166), we cite below an extract from the de-briefing of a DNAR scenario (do not attempt 
resuscitation). This scenario was described by educators as teaching how to break bad news, 
specifically how to tell a relative that a ‘DNAR order’ has been issued on a patient. In hospitals, 
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such orders are issued when a resuscitation attempt is judged likely to be unsuccessful, for 
instance with very frail patients.  
 
In all observed instances of this scenario, the person who had played the role of the relative was 
asked, in the de-briefing, to respond ‘in character’. The extract below gives one example: 
 
Faculty member  You were the son. Very good acting skills, 
[to Julian, who played the I must say. As a son, getting the information 
relative] from her, how did that make you feel? 
Julian I was reassured, that I was put in a space,  
 that I wasn’t lied to, at any point, I was  
 always given the right information for that  
 time […]because I was clearly anxious,  
 you didn’t say, we aren’t going to resuscitate  
 your mother. You actually did it in a very  
 skilled way and so there wasn’t anywhere 
 where I could suddenly, you know, go  
 ballistic, because this hadn’t been discussed 
 with me, and I thought that was very well  
 done actually. 
 [Video transcript] 
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The educator’s/son’s response here illustrates an account of fantasy described by Zizek (1999), 
in which a situation is perceived from an ‘impossible’ perspective – or ‘gaze’, in Zizek’s 
Lacanian terminology. It is impossible in that the educator/son perceives it from two perspectives 
simultaneously: as the son who is ‘reassured’ and not ‘ballistic’; and as the educator who knows 
that he ‘wasn’t lied to’, that he was ‘always given the right information’, and that the trainee’s 
performance can be qualified as ‘skilled’. Zizek’s argument is that impossible gazes are evoked 
to declare how a situation should be felt, rather than simply how it is (this ‘is’ is precisely 
impossible). Julian’s response tells the trainee he did well in informing the relative of the DNAR 
order; but this telling is itself attributed to the relative. It is thus the relative’s voice that speaks to 
the trainee, saying he did well in breaking the news that his mother was going to be allowed to 
die, an impossible, or fantasized, recognition of skill that avoids the potential of that distress 
being realized.  
 
What does the treatment of simulation as the play of phantasmagoria add to an understanding of 
medical simulation? 
 
Running high-fidelity simulation courses involves not only teaching skills, but also acting; 
pretending – and asking trainees to do the same. This phantasmagoric work is not reported on 
widely (but see Taylor, 2011; McNaughton, 2012). One consequence of rendering it invisible is 
that simulation appears to signify by virtue of its technological artifacts (e.g. manikins), rather 
than by virtue of the imaginative work of participants. This point has parallels with the critiques 
of graphical realism in the video-games industry (e.g. Salen & Zimmerman, 2003), when this is 
achieved at the expense of designing meaningful experiences. A second consequence is that such 
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imaginative work is treated as ‘not real’ - as detracting from the real business of transferring 
skills - rather than as what makes such skills sensible. Both of these points have resource 
implications: in the centres we observed, expenditure had been dedicated to purchasing 
technologies, with the resources available for other costs, including staffing, highly restricted. 
Since it is educators who sustain a course’s imaginary work, there is a case to be made for 
revisiting this funding distribution.  
 
If high-fidelity simulation is treated as phantasmagoria, which is meaningful because of its 
emotional vividness, its educational rationale is affected. It need no longer be accountable solely 
in terms of developing skills, and apologetic about its simplification of medical work. Rather, 
there is then scope to explore how it can sustain the deconstruction and analysis of medicine as 
an emotional practice. These contrasting rationales are not mutually exclusive. However, treating 
simulation as phantasmagoria is one response to “simulation deniers” (Turkle, 2009) who state 
that it can never be like real life; that it is trapped within its own magic circle, inherently 
separated from the real world (Caillois, 1967; Juul, 2005). This stance on medical simulation 
characterizes the clinical literature, including the arguments of those who advocate its use: Gaba 
(2004), for example, justifies simulation in medical education in terms of one day achieving 
something akin to Star Trek’s holodeck, a claim which celebrates the achievements of current 
technologies whilst simultaneously deferring their full benefits to some point in the future. 
Others argue that simulation cannot replace work-based learning, but only supplement it (e.g. 
Issenberg et al, 2005; Ziv et al 2003). Both of these qualifications treat simulation as a form of 
illusion: a fake/unreal/inauthentic version of reality.  
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These arguments run parallel to those in the video games literature, in which games are treated as 
‘virtual environments’, cut off from reality by the magic circle of play. As Calleja (2010) argues, 
such methodological treatment inherently makes games/simulations appear relatively trivial 
compared to what they are defined against: ‘reality’. It also overlooks how the boundaries 
between reality and non-reality are anything but firm, but rather negotiated and shifting. 
Calleja’s point is that defining simulation by virtue of its unreality/virtuality overlooks how 
“virtual worlds…are intimately woven into contemporary reality” (p340). Applying this to 
medical simulation, we can argue that treating it as a realistic space in which skills are gained for 
subsequent transfer overlooks how it makes medical work meaningful in distinctive ways, 
staging how belief in medicine is sustained, rather than simply representing it ‘as is’. We can 
then also make a case for seeing medical simulation as a resource with which to explore and 
manipulate the pains and pleasures of work, its failures and frustrations, working through them to 
develop better responses to its tribulations. Rather than simulation acting only as an ante room to 
the hospital workplace, then, it can then also be imagined as a space in which the emotional 
experience of medical work is manipulable, and thus transformable in ways that go beyond the 
transfer of skills, to touch on the meaning of those skills for the experience and quality of work.  
 
We develop this point further in the final part of this paper, since it also pertains to how we 
discuss Frasca’s concept of simulation. For now, however, we will move on to the concept of 
narrative.  
 
Narrative – or the drama of medical simulation 
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When simulation is treated as a realistic setting in which to rehearse skills, a scenario is defined 
as the domain of knowledge to be learned about. In the ‘serious games’ and clinical literature, 
Dieckmann et al (2012) and Alinier (2010) thus refer to a scenario as a patient ‘case’. Gaba et al 
(2001, p.181) describe scenarios as “sets of underlying diseases and […] challenging problems to 
solve”. Barach et al (2001) similarly define them as clinically defined and generalisable 
situations. In our research sites, a scenario was referred to in terms of the clinical condition to be 
taught: there was the anaphylaxis scenario, the upper GI bleeding scenario, the trauma scenario, 
and so on.  
 
Treating scenarios as cases or diseases does not foreground their temporal dimension: the way 
they unfold in time to tell a story. Yet acting out a case means organizing a sequence of events 
narratively. For example, establishing a case on which a doctor can act to effect necessitates 
describing how it arose; which events it comprises – such as a falling blood pressure - and the 
order in which they take place; how long these events last; how they are linked causally. In our 
research sites, trainees were always given a background story before they entered the simulation 
room. The story indicated who they were in the scenario (e.g. a junior doctor on her/his first day 
in the hospital’s emergency department), information about the prospective patient (e.g. Mr 
Bobby Plunger has come in with chest pain), and the chronology they were entering (e.g. the 
nurse has examined him and is calling you in to help). These elements – events organized into a 
causative chronology - are essential components of narrative (Ip, 2011). Our argument in this 
section is that a case’s narrative organization is not simply a way of contextualizing the content 
to be taught, but more importantly, determines how that content can be understood and valued.  
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In game studies, narrative has proved a controversial concept. Without revisiting these debates, 
we can argue that interest in the narratives realized through games and simulations focus on the 
significance of their distinctive structure:  
 
Whereas novels allow us to explore character and drama allows us to explore 
action, simulation narrative can allow us to explore process. Because the 
computer is a procedural medium, it does not just describe or observe 
behavioural patterns, the way printed text or moving photography does; it 
embodies and executes them. And as a participatory medium, it allows us to 
collaborate in the performance. Using the computer, we can enact, modify, 
control and understand processes as we never could before (Murray, 1997, 
p181). 
 
The simulations we observed were not computer-based and, in this respect, were more akin to 
drama than simulation, using Murray’s definition here. And indeed, scenarios were only ever 
played once, rather than ‘modified’ to ‘control and understand their processes’ – suggesting that 
the pedagogic emphasis was on evaluating action rather than gaining procedural understanding 
(we return to this point in the next section). Murray’s work on simulation narratives is only 
selectively applicable then, in our study, although its argument offers important insights. Before 
we present these, we will do a brief detour into relevant work on drama-based narratives, to 
identify the significance of the actions represented in the scenarios. 
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The work of Jacobs (2003) is helpful in understanding the genre of narrative with which 
scenario-based actions can be understood. Jacobs describes the rise of a genre of medical TV 
drama called ‘body trauma’, in which trauma is the primary plot device. Whereas previous 
medical dramas staged the power of medical science to cure the ills of society (Dr Kildare, 
Medic) or mapped the social anxieties of the baby boom generation onto the body (MASH, 
Casualty), more recent shows (ER, Chicago Hope) make the body’s visceral injury the cause of a 
narrative’s dramatic events.  
 
This trait characterized the scenarios we observed, in which the cause of events was the body’s 
sudden deterioration. Acute symptoms were thus the starting point of narrative development: a 
sudden fall in blood pressure, the lack of a pulse, the cessation of respiration. Death was 
invariably imminent, with medical intervention framed as an act that stabilized the body. The 
hospital thereby appeared as the front line in the fight against tragedy; a war zone, rather than a 
place of healing. Educators explained this emphasis on emergencies in terms of teaching the 
management of crises, with some adding that it also made for an exciting training day.  
 
Jacobs quotes Michael Fitzpatrick (p. 12) on the ideological significance of body trauma: “once 
you give up on any prospect of achieving progress in society, your horizons are reduced to 
securing your own physical survival”. The argument, here, is that dramatizations of medicine 
which focus almost exclusively on disease as a sudden contingency in the body detaches its 
appearance from the wider context of the patient’s life. Doctors are positioned in particular ways, 
making highly visible the power of doctor-heroes over life and death (Gordon et al, 1998). This 
dramatisation of disease, and of the social function of doctors, has implications for understanding 
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the effectivity of clinical work: what it pertains to and what it does not, what a clinical case is 
and what it is not. This is effectively also what is taught on simulation-based courses; ideology, 
not simply skills.  
 
We will now turn more specifically to the significance of interactivity in these narratives, which 
is Murray’s central concern. She organizes her argument around aesthetic concepts, two of which 
we will focus on here: immersion and agency. 
 
Immersion 
Murray’s argument on immersion echoes some of the points we made about play. She states that 
immersion is a function of fantasy: we create belief, rather than suspend disbelief. Fiction/play is 
immersive when intelligence is applied to reinforce rather than question the reality of the 
experience. Immersion does not pertain to losing sight of the real world, then, but rather to the 
creative and willing negotiation between the two: “sharing an unscripted fantasy environment 
with other people entails a constant negotiation of the story line and also of the boundary 
between the consensual hallucination and the actual world” (p.112). 
 
This emphasis on negotiation highlights the importance of a practice we observed called ‘meet 
the manikin’. It involved educators teaching trainees how to interpret the simulation 
environment: 
 
Geraldine takes the trainees into the simulation room and points out where 
equipment is stored, where the cameras and microphones are, and how the 
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manikin works. She lifts its arm to show that it already has a cannula attached to 
it. She says this is because the manikin is too expensive to be replaced as a result 
of the wear and tear of frequent injections. She says ‘if he's not meant to have a 
cannula in, I'll just cover his arm with his bedsheets. I'll tell you if he's sweaty or 
clammy. You can inject him and it goes into a bucket underneath, so don't kick 
the bucket’. 
[Field notes] 
 
The ‘meet the manikin’ practice sets out the semiotic conventions specific to the simulation 
room: if the patient’s arm is covered by bedsheets, this means he doesn’t have a cannula in. Not 
only is the role of imagination highlighted again here; it also shows that the credibility of the 
simulated world results from acceptance of its distinctive semiotics. 
 
This is significant because it means that immersion is undermined not so much by lack of realism 
(e.g a patient who arrives in hospital with a cannula) as by a rejection of its semiotics. This point 
can be illustrated in reference to a pattern identifiable in de-briefing transcripts: when the 
performance of a trainee was evaluated poorly (a judgment almost exclusively carried out by 
trainees on themselves), s/he also named differences between the ‘real world’ and the simulation. 
For example, one trainee explained his failure to treat anaphylaxis correctly as follows: 
  
I think in real life it would be more obvious if someone was having an 
anaphylactic reaction, so you could get a bit more certainty.  
[video transcript] 
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This pattern raises a question about the appropriateness of simulation to teach about error or 
individual poor performance. If doubt is raised about the semiotics of the simulation, so will be 
the recognition of error. Several researchers have already noted the difficulty of identifying 
errors on simulation courses (Dieckmann et al, 2012; Rudolph et al, 2007), and treat this as a 
problem of de-briefing technique; it may however be more effectively considered and then 
addressed by treating it as a function of simulation.  
 
Agency 
Proponents of medical simulation emphasize that it supports trainees’ agency, enabling them to 
learn at their own pace, rather than that required by the clinical workplace (Ziv et al, 2003). 
Murray is similarly interested in how agency is granted in interactive texts. She identifies a 
generic plot device, resonant of detective stories, in which the player hero advances the narrative 
by evaluating the significance of available evidence.  
 
This device characterized observed scenarios, in which trainees advanced events by reading 
patient notes given by the ‘plant’, and examining the manikin for further clues. It was this device 
therefore which sustained the demand to ascertain the cause of the symptoms. Trainees’ 
identification of the guilty party, such as ectopic pregnancy or transfusion reaction, provoked 
signs of jubilation and relief among observers, who occasionally shouted ‘bingo!’, ‘he’s got it!’, 
or screamed at the TV sets when a clue had been overlooked: ‘check the name on the blood bag!’ 
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Representing medicine as investigative, detective work portrays the clinician in a distinctive light. 
It makes investigative genius shine out against slavish adhesion to institutional procedure. 
Rapezzi et al (2005), for instance, use the figure of the detective clinician to highlight the 
importance of clinical acumen in the face of the uncritical application of protocols. Commitment 
to an aesthetics of agency may therefore illuminate why de-briefing talk focused on endorsing 
individual qualities, such as a trainee’s communication skills, rather than on the examination of 
standardized protocols, which feature prominently in human factors literature (Dejours, 2008). 
Protocols prescribe action, and in this respect, restrict agency (this is Rapezzi et al’s critique). 
The teaching of human factors, understood as justifying the prescription of action, was therefore 
at odds with an aesthetics of agentive action.   
 
Murray’s distinction between agency and authorship (p. 153) is helpful in clarifying the peculiar 
conditions for agency in simulation. She argues that although players exercise agency, authors 
determine the conditions for this exercise. The relevance of this point is brought out by Corliss 
(2010) who argues that simulations foreground decision-making whilst disciplining players 
towards a particular course of action, by determining what counts as a good decision. This 
argument makes visible the scope for agency: it isn’t so much that trainees controlled their own 
learning, but rather that educators determined how and to what effect trainees encountered 
situations to be learned from.  
 
What does the treatment of scenarios as narratives add to an understanding of medical 
simulation? 
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Narrative analyses account for the way in which representations of reality appear realistic. This 
problematises the treatment of realism as a quality of unmediated reality, and points instead to 
the role of cultural frameworks of interpretation/imagination, by means of which the real 
becomes sensible. Evolutions in the narratives of medical dramas highlight how ‘realistic’ 
representations of medicine transform over time, reflecting the changing meaning of medicine. 
Simulating medicine (or indeed anything) is not a question of objectivity therefore, as the term 
‘fidelity’ implies; it is necessarily subjective and ideological. Bogost (2006, 2007), who has 
taken forward Murray’s concern with procedural narrative, puts it so: “a simulation is a 
representation of a source system via a less complex system that informs the user’s 
understanding of the source system in a subjective way” (Bogost 2006, p98). Simulation is made 
possible by the exercise of choice over how to represent/narrate the ‘source system’, and these 
choices reflect cultural values: “no simulation can escape some ideological context” (p99). 
 
This argument was in fact widely accepted in practice (if not in theory) in our research settings, 
in which nurses and surgeons identified the way manikins represented/enacted the body from an 
anaesthetic perspective: as a site of anaesthetic action. In other words, the medical world 
simulated through the use of the manikin sustained stories of anesthetic action, marginalising the 
actions of other professions – as surgeons sometimes complained.   
 
Treating simulation as ideological enables novel questions to be articulated: from whose 
perspective is a scenario represented/enacted? What/whose forms of action and agency does its 
narrative structure enable and disable? Who is made hero and who has the walk-on part? 
Discussing such questions explicitly with trainees might prevent de-briefing discussions 
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becoming mired in debates over the realism of a scenario (which we observed repeatedly, as 
noted above), and enable educators to focus instead on how medicine, and medical errors, are 
perceived from different perspectives. Such discussions seem important to articulating the 
attachments of different professions and grades to versions of medical realities and the scope for 
agentive action within these, and therefore to clarifying where and why such versions do not 
cohere. It also seems important to making explicit how medicine constructs the world to make it 
into its domain of action.  
 
Simulation – or the participatory politics of enacting a variable system 
 
In game studies, much intellectual effort has gone into identifying the aesthetic features specific 
to simulation, by contrast to play and narrative more generally. It seems ironic that the 
simulation-based courses we observed did not comply with many of these specific features, as 
identified by Frasca (2001, 2003, 2004), who describes them as follows: a simulation (unlike a 
narrative) is re-played repeatedly by virtue of its systemic variables (rather than read once); 
variables can be changed to see their effect; variables determine how a simulation operates rather 
than its objective. From this definition, Frasca identifies the educational value of simulation in 
terms of repetition and experimentation with variables. Most of the trainees in our study, 
however, attended simulation-based courses once or twice over a training period of several years; 
performed a scenario once on any one course; had no opportunity, during a scenario, to change 
the variables (e.g. start again and change the treatment); and the objective was invariably pre-
determined by the curriculum. De-briefing discussions sustained a kind of repetition and 
experimentation, with alternative scenarios realized discursively (e.g. an educator asking trainees 
 31 
to say what would have happened if X had been different), but this was never enacted. The 
reason for this was budgetary: removing trainees and educators from their work in order to train 
is expensive, as is re-organising the postgraduate curriculum. 
 
The absence of repetition and experimentation with variables demonstrates how limited the 
scope has been, in practice, to exploit the aesthetic qualities of simulation in medicine. With 
respect to the serious games literature, this absence points to the difference between simulation 
performed in experimental settings or at the prototype stage, and simulation performed as an 
educational practice; indeed, nearly all the literature claiming to know the educational outcomes 
of clinical simulation is based on experiments involving repeated practice, rather than once every 
couple of years (e.g. Larsen et al, 2009). With respect to accounts of procedural rhetorics 
(Bogost, 2007), which have built on Frasca’s work, this absence also points to the difference 
between the aesthetics of a simulation/game as a stand-alone entity and its aesthetics within an 
assemblage of social practices. 
 
However, there was one exception to this one-off pattern of provision, which we will describe 
because it aligns more closely with Frasca’s vision, and thus points to how immersive simulation 
might be done differently in medicine. It consisted of a course funded by a hospital’s 
management body, which was intended to address a high rate of ‘failure to rescue’ incidents
iv
 on 
one ward. The course involved all staff on that ward - by contrast to junior medical trainees only. 
It ran repeatedly over several months. On the day Caroline observed, several of the ward’s nurses 
interrupted the introductory lecture on the importance of communication skills (which educators 
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intended to teach about) to interject that ‘failure to rescue’ incidents were not caused by a dearth 
of such skills, but rather by management’s irresponsible cost-cutting exercises: 
 
So what are you going to do if you come round to my ward and I have seven 
patients to look after, two post-ops, and no HCA
v
. What are you going to say or 
do? 
[Field notes] 
 
The presence of ‘management’, in the form of the deputy director of nursing, meant that this 
version of reality was counterposed by another: that the hospital’s funding was being cut, with 
little prospect of future increases. The debate that followed set versions of the reality of work 
against each other. Nurses pointed to the fictional status of work ‘systems’ designed to identify 
deteriorating patients; ‘management’ disclaimed the power to resolve this. The exchanges – 
unintentionally - shaped what was treated as the object of the simulation: a scenario was not seen 
as indicative of an individual’s capacity to respond to an emergency, but rather of working 
conditions, as this extract illustrates:   
 
Tutor 1 The problem is, Sally, you didn’t tell your team-mates  
 you had the sickest patient. I was just interested in  
 knowing - it’s not a criticism - why you felt you had to  
 cope on your own? 
Nurse 1 (Sally) That’s what I do on the ward 
Tutor 1 You might be stuck in a ward when you are trying to  
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 cope and you don’t go and get help? 
Nurse 1 I’m just re-living yesterday, it’s constantly juggling. I  
 find it heavy-going, but I don’t want to seem I’m not 
 coping with it 
Nurse 2 We need to re-design the system so that nurse leaders  
 don’t get attached to particular beds and oversee the  
 whole ward [there follows an extended discussion  
 about whether this system is in fact already in place but  
 undermined by staff shortages.] 
Tutor 1 You need to think as a group how you want to deal 
with these situations. You need to have agreement on 
this, as a unit 
 [Field notes] 
  
The exchange illustrates how the course became an occasion on which to critique and re-think 
how clinical work (‘the system’) was done and divided up; in other words, why its existing 
variables led to one kind of outcome, and how these could be altered to achieve a different effect. 
The scenarios were not treated/seen as simulating different clinical cases or diseases, but rather 
the same processes of work, repeatedly, at different points in their operation. De-briefing 
discussions gave rise to and debated the virtues of competing accounts of this ‘system’, as well 
as alternatives to it, with no pre-determined known and correct answer (see Tutor 1’s last 
intervention, which demonstrates the skill she deployed in negotiating an emotionally charged 
situation). This meant that the perspectives used by the different parties to explain ‘failure to 
 34 
rescue’ were challenged: that management were only concerned with financial targets; that 
nurses lacked communication skills. As a consequence, other explanations, previously 
unimagined and unimaginable, were generated.  
 
Agreement was not reached on the day Caroline visited the hospital. However, a principle of 
ongoing collective review, instantiated in the course’s iterative design, appeared to have gained 
support among both staff and ‘management’.  
 
The course illustrates Frasca’s claim that simulations sustain explorations of how versions of 
reality are generated and maintained, and also how they can be de-stabilised. This vision of 
simulation does not necessarily lead to the kind of radical transformation evoked by Bogost 
(2007) in terms of an ‘event’ –in reference to Badiou - but it does demonstrate how training-
oriented, ‘serious’ simulations give rise to aesthetic reconfigurations which make the world 
appear alterable. This has implications for imagining the ethics of medical simulation: simulation 
may not be ethical because it is safe, but precisely because it is dangerous. It puts versions of 
reality at stake. 
 
What does the treatment of simulation as the enactment of a variable system add to an 
understanding of medical simulation? 
 
Frasca’s account of simulation is suggestive of the benefits of ‘playing’ with a modeled system, 
rather than modelling the system to secure its reproduction. This understanding of simulation 
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foregrounds pedagogic practices of debate, critique and invention, based on the enactment of 
different realities, rather than the transfer of what is already known.  
 
Bogost’s (2007, p57-8) account of ‘persuasive games’ has more recently elaborated on Frasca’s 
notion of simulation, and defined ‘persuasive games’ in opposition to ‘serious games’, in that the 
former “facilitate dialectical interrogation of process-based claims about how real-world 
processes do, could or should work, [and…] speak past or against the fixed worldviews of 
institutions like governments and corporations, […interrogating] those institutions themselves, 
recommending correctives and alternatives”. The course described above illustrates what this 
might look like empirically, and is suggestive of a different rationale for simulation-based 
medical education: one that focuses on organizational development, rather than the transfer of 
skills. Such a rationale is commonly articulated in the clinical literature (e.g. Gaba, 2004), but is 
treated as identical to the transfer of skills, rather than different from (and possibly antithetical 
to) this objective. Frasca’s and Bogost’s arguments are helpful in showing the difference 
between simulating to reproduce a practice versus transform it. Their arguments have affinities 
with accounts of work-based learning which endeavour to move away from defining learning as 
the transmission of what is already known, to the learning of “something that is not yet there” 
(Engestrom and Sannino, 2010); something that has not already been thought, but is worked out 
by participants to address the concrete and contextual challenges of their work. In tandem, both 
sets of arguments identify possibilities for considering and using simulation in medicine in ways 
that are under-explored.  
 
Why study medical simulation as a cultural practice?  
 36 
 
We wrote this paper to identify the benefits for simulation-based medical education of treating 
simulation as a cultural practice, and to broaden the analytic focus in the ‘serious games’ 
literature beyond the measurement of intended outcomes. We also hope to have shown the scope 
of concepts articulated in relation to game play, and to demonstrate the empirical reach of 
aesthetic analyses of games and simulations.  
 
Studying medical simulation as a cultural practice demonstrates the significance of imagination 
and fantasy in maintaining the credibility of simulation. What turns a plastic manikin into a 
patient on the verge of death, or body trauma into a justification for medical intervention, is not 
fidelity to a hypothesized real, but rather fidelity to a set of values and cultural imaginaries. This 
has implications for educational practices, pointing to the value of moving away from concerns 
with technologies per se, and exploring instead practices for enhancing or disturbing belief, as 
well as their ethics and politics. One way of doing this is to focus on the affectivity of clinical 
practice, including how ‘fidelity’ to its sense of purpose is sustained and the disturbances caused 
to this, notably by the fear of medical error. 
 
With respect to the game studies literature, the analysis shows novel empirical instantiations of 
common concepts. It confirms some of the critiques of the ‘serious games’ literature offered by 
those who treat all games seriously, in the sense of worthy topics of academic study, by 
highlighting some of the methodological limitations of focusing on designers’ intentions. We 
also hope to have made a case for not leaving games and simulations in educational settings to 
the ‘serious games’ research lobby. This is what Bogost (2007, p57) does in his criticism of the 
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‘serious game’ initiative: “Educational games translate existing pedagogical goals into 
videogame form;…health games provide doctors and medical institutions with videogame-based 
tools to accomplish their existing needs”. We would suggest that educational simulations, 
including ones in medicine, do not simply translate ‘existing needs’ into a new representational 
form, but rather that such needs and the aesthetics of the form emerge in tandem, re-shaping one 
another and thereby making original meanings possible.  
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i
 The professional body responsible, at the time, for funding post-graduate medical education in London. 
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ii
 Doctors are classified as trainees when they are following a training programme subsequent to their medical degree. 
During this ‘training period’, they work as doctors, but also engage in structured and compulsory training.  
iii
 Sutton-Smith’s definition and analysis of play research rhetorics has many similarities with the meta-narrative 
method in clinical research, which reviews literature by uncovering its philosophical assumptions and 
methodological approaches, as seen for instance in Greenhalgh et al (2009). 
iv
 ‘Failure to rescue’ is a category with the health service’s taxonomy of errors, and refers to a failure to identify a 
rapidly deteriorating patient, who then goes on to die. 
v
 HCA stands for healthcare assistant 
